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Hearing But Not Listening: Comparative Competition Law and the 
DOJ Monopoly Report 
 
Spencer Weber Waller* 
 
he Department of Justice (“DOJ”) monopoly report1 is enormously disappointing 
for a number of reasons. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) was wise to 
participate in this important project, but equally wise to distance itself from the final 
work product. The final report represents a serious effort, but reads in too many places 
like a justification for a record of inaction by the DOJ and an attempt to lock in future 
administrations to a similar course. I suspect that the report will achieve neither of these 
goals and hope that the DOJ’s Antitrust Division of the next administration rejoins the 
FTC in bringing both innovative and traditional monopolization investigations and cases 
where appropriate.2 
Many critics (including the majority of the FTC commissioners) have pointed out 
the substantive shortcomings of the report. I would like to focus instead on the missed 
opportunity of the report to study, and take seriously, the substantive law on the abuse of 
a dominant position that exists in the many jurisdictions outside the United States. The 
hearing featured a number of witnesses from outside the United States, although the 
                                                 
*Spencer Weber Waller is Professor and Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law 
1U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF 
THE SHERMAN ACT 129 (2008).  
2 For a very different take on an appropriate monopolization policy for the United States going 
forward see AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA 55-94 (2008), available at 
http://antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/transitionreport.ashx. 
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majority of them participated only in the hearings on so-called “international issues.” In 
addition, other witnesses from the United States made reference to developments from 
outside the United States. But the question remains whether anyone was listening, and 
how the DOJ could have taken advantage of these comparative perspectives from an 
increasingly multipolar competition world and incorporated them into the final report. 
Outside the international perspectives chapter, there are few references to the laws 
or decisions of foreign jurisdictions, even though the DOJ acknowledges that global 
companies are subject to an increasing array of differing rules concerning the very 
conduct discussed in the report. Even the international chapter too often reflects the 
attitude that the U.S. approach is necessarily best and any jurisdiction that acts differently 
needs to harmonize their law more in accordance with the report’s recommendations. 
The reality is that the European Community, far more than the United States, has 
provided the model for the rest of the world for rules governing the behavior of dominant 
firms and the report fails to incorporate any of that learning. We are not exactly alone, but 
the highly lenient rules recommended by the report for predatory pricing, tying, bundling, 
technology licensing, and refusals to deal hardly reflects the majority position that most 
global companies have to deal with on a daily basis. 
One example of this failing can be seen in the report’s treatment of refusals to 
deal and the essential facilities doctrine. The report is unrelenting in its criticism of 
imposing any duty to deal on a dominant firm lest pro-competitive behavior and 
innovation be chilled by incumbents and other firms. The report concludes that “the 
  
               
                                                                             
RELEASE: SEP-08 (2) 
 
 
WWW.GLOBALCOMPETITIONPOLICY.ORG 
 
Competition Policy International, Inc. © 2008. Copying, reprinting, or distributing this article is forbidden by anyone other than the publisher or author. 
 
 
4
 
essential-facilities doctrine is a flawed means of deciding whether a unilateral, 
unconditional refusal to deal harms competition,” and “that antitrust liability for 
unconditional refusals to deal with rivals should not play a meaningful part in Section 2 
enforcement.”3 The same suspicion of the need for non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure, networks, and platform technologies under certain carefully limited 
circumstances as a tool of competition policy is reiterated in the later chapter on 
remedies.4 
A closer look at this issue reveals several significant problems which are a 
microcosm of the flaws of the report as a whole. The witnesses and literature discussed in 
this section are a small subset of the vast commentary on the essential facilities doctrine 
and refusals to deal which reflects a far greater diversity of views that the report 
acknowledges. The U.S. case law is quoted selectively and misleadingly, with two of the 
three quotes from the 1919 Colgate case omitting the crucial qualifier that there is no 
general duty to deal “in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.”5 
Concerns about harm to efficiency and innovation are many, but are nothing more than 
vague and undocumented rhetoric. References to harm to competition through the denial 
of access to bottleneck monopolies and infrastructure are few and far between. 
The chapter, like most of the rest of the report, would also have benefited from an 
analysis of what the rest of the world is doing with respect to this issue. No foreign 
witnesses were heard on this issue and comparative law does not appear to have been a 
                                                 
3 Supra note 1 at 129. 
4 Id. at 143-59. 
5 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
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significant part of the testimony or literature considered in the report. A more 
comprehensive and cosmopolitan look at the essential facilities doctrine and related open 
access requirements would have revealed that these doctrines are alive and well 
throughout foreign competition law and for the most part have been applied in a sensible, 
limited, and pro-competitive fashion.6  
In addition to the EC which has a substantial line of decisions and judgments in 
this area, such diverse jurisdictions as the U.K., Israel, Ireland, New Zealand, Germany, 
the World Trade Organization, and other national and regional competition bodies have 
recognized the obligation of dominant firms to provide non-discriminatory access to their 
facilities under different limiting principles. It is the United States, and not the rest of the 
world that is increasingly out of step on this issue and the report represents a missed 
opportunity to take advantage of a world of experience on this issue. 
Current events suggest that continuing a position of parochialism and 
exceptionalism for the United States on issues of market fundamentalism is rapidly 
becoming a thing of the past. While there is much to admire in the hard work and serious 
research displayed in the DOJ monopolization report, it is ironic that it appeared just 
weeks before an unadulterated faith in unregulated markets as best serving the needs of 
consumers and society came crashing down on a much broader scale. Ultimately, 
however, the shortcomings of the report, and not just its timing, suggest a short shelf life 
and little impact regardless of the next administration in Washington. 
                                                 
6 A more favorable economic view of the essential facilities doctrine based on the need for access to a 
narrowly defined notion of infrastructure is set forth in Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, 
Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008); Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets, 
and Essential Facilities, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 360 (analyzing both US and EU developments). 
